Lazarus Group

Data from Local System

Lazarus Group has collected data and files from compromised networks.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Loaders)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster RATs)(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021)

Keylogging

Lazarus Group malware KiloAlfa contains keylogging functionality.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Tools)

Local Data Staging

Lazarus Group malware IndiaIndia saves information gathered about the victim to a file that is saved in the %TEMP% directory, then compressed, encrypted, and uploaded to a C2 server.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Loaders)

Archive Collected Data

Lazarus Group has compressed exfiltrated data with RAR and used RomeoDelta malware to archive specified directories in .zip format, encrypt the .zip file, and upload it to C2. (Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Loaders)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster RATs)(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018)

Archive via Library

Lazarus Group malware IndiaIndia saves information gathered about the victim to a file that is compressed with Zlib, encrypted, and uploaded to a C2 server.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster RATs)(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018)

Archive via Custom Method

A Lazarus Group malware sample encrypts data using a simple byte based XOR operation prior to exfiltration.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Loaders)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster RATs)(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018)

Protocol or Service Impersonation

Lazarus Group malware also uses a unique form of communication encryption known as FakeTLS that mimics TLS but uses a different encryption method, potentially evading SSL traffic inspection/decryption.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018)(Citation: McAfee-GhostSecret-fixurl)

Fallback Channels

Lazarus Group malware SierraAlfa sends data to one of the hard-coded C2 servers chosen at random, and if the transmission fails, chooses a new C2 server to attempt the transmission again.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster RATs)

Web Protocols

Lazarus Group has conducted C2 over HTTP and HTTPS.(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018)(Citation: SentinelOne Lazarus macOS July 2020)(Citation: TrendMicro macOS Dacls May 2020)(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)(Citation: Qualys LolZarus)(Citation: ESET Twitter Ida Pro Nov 2021)

Internal Proxy

Lazarus Group has used a compromised router to serve as a proxy between a victim network's corporate and restricted segments.(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021)

External Proxy

Lazarus Group has used multiple proxies to obfuscate network traffic from victims.(Citation: US-CERT FALLCHILL Nov 2017)(Citation: TrendMicro macOS Dacls May 2020)

Bidirectional Communication

Lazarus Group has used GitHub as C2, pulling hosted image payloads then committing command execution output to files in specific directories.(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)

Multi-Stage Channels

Lazarus Group has used multi-stage malware components that inject later stages into separate processes.(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)

Ingress Tool Transfer

Lazarus Group has downloaded files, malware, and tools from its C2 onto a compromised host.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Loaders)(Citation: SentinelOne Lazarus macOS July 2020)(Citation: TrendMicro macOS Dacls May 2020)(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021)(Citation: Google TAG Lazarus Jan 2021)(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)(Citation: Qualys LolZarus)(Citation: ESET Twitter Ida Pro Nov 2021)

Standard Encoding

A Lazarus Group malware sample encodes data with base64.(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018)

Non-Standard Port

Some Lazarus Group malware uses a list of ordered port numbers to choose a port for C2 traffic, creating port-protocol mismatches.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster RATs)

Symmetric Cryptography

Several Lazarus Group malware families encrypt C2 traffic using custom code that uses XOR with an ADD operation and XOR with a SUB operation. Another Lazarus Group malware sample XORs C2 traffic. Other Lazarus Group malware uses Caracachs encryption to encrypt C2 payloads. Lazarus Group has also used AES to encrypt C2 traffic.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018)(Citation: McAfee GhostSecret)

Password Spraying

Lazarus Group malware attempts to connect to Windows shares for lateral movement by using a generated list of usernames, which center around permutations of the username Administrator, and weak passwords.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster RATs)

Name Resolution Poisoning and SMB Relay

Lazarus Group executed Responder using the command <code>[Responder file path] -i [IP address] -rPv</code> on a compromised host to harvest credentials and move laterally.(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021)

Code Signing

Lazarus Group has digitally signed malware and utilities to evade detection.(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)

Disable or Modify Tools

Lazarus Group malware TangoDelta attempts to terminate various processes associated with McAfee. Additionally, Lazarus Group malware SHARPKNOT disables the Microsoft Windows System Event Notification and Alerter services.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Loaders)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Tools)(Citation: US-CERT SHARPKNOT June 2018).

Windows Host Firewall

Various Lazarus Group malware modifies the Windows firewall to allow incoming connections or disable it entirely using netsh. (Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Loaders)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Tools)

Application Window Discovery

Lazarus Group malware IndiaIndia obtains and sends to its C2 server the title of the window for each running process. The KilaAlfa keylogger also reports the title of the window in the foreground.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Loaders)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Tools)

Query Registry

Lazarus Group malware IndiaIndia checks Registry keys within HKCU and HKLM to determine if certain applications are present, including SecureCRT, Terminal Services, RealVNC, TightVNC, UltraVNC, Radmin, mRemote, TeamViewer, FileZilla, pcAnyware, and Remote Desktop. Another Lazarus Group malware sample checks for the presence of the following Registry key:<code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Bitcoin\Bitcoin-Qt</code>.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Loaders)(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018)

System Network Configuration Discovery

Lazarus Group malware IndiaIndia obtains and sends to its C2 server information about the first network interface card’s configuration, including IP address, gateways, subnet mask, DHCP information, and whether WINS is available.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Loaders)

System Owner/User Discovery

Various Lazarus Group malware enumerates logged-on users.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Loaders)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster RATs)(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018)(Citation: SentinelOne Lazarus macOS July 2020)(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)

Network Service Discovery

Lazarus Group has used nmap from a router VM to scan ports on systems within the restricted segment of an enterprise network.(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021)

System Network Connections Discovery

Lazarus Group has used <code>net use</code> to identify and establish a network connection with a remote host.(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021)

Process Discovery

Several Lazarus Group malware families gather a list of running processes on a victim system and send it to their C2 server. A Destover-like variant used by Lazarus Group also gathers process times.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Loaders)(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018)(Citation: McAfee GhostSecret)(Citation: TrendMicro macOS Dacls May 2020)(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)

System Information Discovery

Several Lazarus Group malware families collect information on the type and version of the victim OS, as well as the victim computer name and CPU information.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Loaders)(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018)(Citation: McAfee GhostSecret)(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)

File and Directory Discovery

Lazarus Group malware can use a common function to identify target files by their extension, and some also enumerate files and directories, including a Destover-like variant that lists files and gathers information for all drives.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: McAfee GhostSecret)(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)(Citation: Qualys LolZarus)

System Time Discovery

A Destover-like implant used by Lazarus Group can obtain the current system time and send it to the C2 server.(Citation: McAfee GhostSecret)

Local Storage Discovery

A Destover-like variant used by Lazarus Group collects disk space information and sends it to its C2 server.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Loaders)(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018)(Citation: McAfee GhostSecret)(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)

Windows Management Instrumentation

Lazarus Group has used WMIC for discovery as well as to execute payloads for persistence and lateral movement.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster RATs)(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021)(Citation: Qualys LolZarus)

Scheduled Task

Lazarus Group has used <code>schtasks</code> for persistence including through the periodic execution of a remote XSL script or a dropped VBS payload.(Citation: Qualys LolZarus)(Citation: ESET Twitter Ida Pro Nov 2021)

PowerShell

Lazarus Group has used PowerShell to execute commands and malicious code.(Citation: Google TAG Lazarus Jan 2021)

Windows Command Shell

Lazarus Group malware uses cmd.exe to execute commands on a compromised host.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018)(Citation: US-CERT SHARPKNOT June 2018)(Citation: Qualys LolZarus) A Destover-like variant used by Lazarus Group uses a batch file mechanism to delete its binaries from the system.(Citation: McAfee GhostSecret)

Visual Basic

Lazarus Group has used VBA and embedded macros in Word documents to execute malicious code.(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)(Citation: Qualys LolZarus)

Native API

Lazarus Group has used the Windows API <code>ObtainUserAgentString</code> to obtain the User-Agent from a compromised host to connect to a C2 server.(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Jul 2020) Lazarus Group has also used various, often lesser known, functions to perform various types of Discovery and Process Injection.(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)(Citation: Qualys LolZarus)

Exploitation for Client Execution

Lazarus Group has exploited Adobe Flash vulnerability CVE-2018-4878 for execution.(Citation: McAfee Bankshot)

Malicious File

Lazarus Group has attempted to get users to launch a malicious Microsoft Word attachment delivered via a spearphishing email.(Citation: McAfee Bankshot)(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021)(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)(Citation: Qualys LolZarus)

Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

Lazarus Group has exfiltrated data and files over a C2 channel through its various tools and malware.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Loaders)(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018)

Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol

Lazarus Group malware SierraBravo-Two generates an email message via SMTP containing information about newly infected victims.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster RATs)

Data Destruction

Lazarus Group has used a custom secure delete function to overwrite file contents with data from heap memory.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)

Service Stop

Lazarus Group has stopped the MSExchangeIS service to render Exchange contents inaccessible to users.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)

Internal Defacement

Lazarus Group replaced the background wallpaper of systems with a threatening image after rendering the system unbootable with a Disk Structure Wipe.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)

System Shutdown/Reboot

Lazarus Group has rebooted systems after destroying files and wiping the MBR on infected systems.(Citation: US-CERT SHARPKNOT June 2018)

Disk Content Wipe

Lazarus Group has used malware like WhiskeyAlfa to overwrite the first 64MB of every drive with a mix of static and random buffers. A similar process is then used to wipe content in logical drives and, finally, attempt to wipe every byte of every sector on every drive. WhiskeyBravo can be used to overwrite the first 4.9MB of physical drives. WhiskeyDelta can overwrite the first 132MB or 1.5MB of each drive with random data from heap memory.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)

Disk Structure Wipe

Lazarus Group malware SHARPKNOT overwrites and deletes the Master Boot Record (MBR) on the victim's machine and has possessed MBR wiper malware since at least 2009.(Citation: US-CERT SHARPKNOT June 2018)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)

Drive-by Compromise

Lazarus Group delivered RATANKBA and other malicious code to victims via a compromised legitimate website.(Citation: RATANKBA)(Citation: Google TAG Lazarus Jan 2021)

Spearphishing Attachment

Lazarus Group has targeted victims with spearphishing emails containing malicious Microsoft Word documents.(Citation: McAfee Bankshot)(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021)(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)(Citation: Qualys LolZarus)

Spearphishing Link

Lazarus Group has sent malicious links to victims via email.(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021)

Spearphishing via Service

Lazarus Group has used social media platforms, including LinkedIn and Twitter, to send spearphishing messages.(Citation: Google TAG Lazarus Jan 2021)

Remote Desktop Protocol

Lazarus Group malware SierraCharlie uses RDP for propagation.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster RATs)

SMB/Windows Admin Shares

Lazarus Group malware SierraAlfa accesses the <code>ADMIN$</code> share via SMB to conduct lateral movement.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster RATs)

SSH

Lazarus Group used SSH and the PuTTy PSCP utility to gain access to a restricted segment of a compromised network.(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021)

Account Manipulation

Lazarus Group malware WhiskeyDelta-Two contains a function that attempts to rename the administrator’s account.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)

Windows Service

Several Lazarus Group malware families install themselves as new services.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)

Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

Lazarus Group has maintained persistence by loading malicious code into a startup folder or by adding a Registry Run key.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster RATs)(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018)(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)

Shortcut Modification

Lazarus Group malware has maintained persistence on a system by creating a LNK shortcut in the user’s Startup folder.(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018)

Email Addresses

Lazarus Group collected email addresses belonging to various departments of a targeted organization which were used in follow-on phishing campaigns.(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021)

Gather Victim Org Information

Lazarus Group has studied publicly available information about a targeted organization to tailor spearphishing efforts against specific departments and/or individuals.(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021)

Domains

Lazarus Group has acquired domains related to their campaigns to act as distribution points and C2 channels.(Citation: CISA AppleJeus Feb 2021)(Citation: Google TAG Lazarus Jan 2021)

Web Services

Lazarus Group has hosted malicious downloads on Github.(Citation: CISA AppleJeus Feb 2021)

Server

Lazarus Group has compromised servers to stage malicious tools.(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021)

Social Media Accounts

Lazarus Group has created new Twitter accounts to conduct social engineering against potential victims.(Citation: Google TAG Lazarus Jan 2021)

Email Accounts

Lazarus Group has created new email accounts for spearphishing operations.(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021)

Malware

Lazarus Group has developed custom malware for use in their operations.(Citation: CISA AppleJeus Feb 2021)(Citation: Google TAG Lazarus Jan 2021)

Tool

Lazarus Group has obtained a variety of tools for their operations, including Responder and PuTTy PSCP.(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021)

Digital Certificates

Lazarus Group has obtained SSL certificates for their C2 domains.(Citation: CISA AppleJeus Feb 2021)

Dynamic API Resolution

Lazarus Group has used a custom hashing method to resolve APIs used in shellcode.(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)

Embedded Payloads

Lazarus Group has distributed malicious payloads embedded in PNG files.(Citation: Microsoft DiamondSleet 2023)

Encrypted/Encoded File

Lazarus Group has used multiple types of encryption and encoding for their payloads, including AES, Caracachs, RC4, XOR, Base64, and other tricks such as creating aliases in code for Native API function names.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Loaders)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster RATs)(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018)(Citation: TrendMicro macOS Dacls May 2020)(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)(Citation: Qualys LolZarus)

Rename Legitimate Utilities

Lazarus Group has renamed system utilities such as <code>wscript.exe</code> and <code>mshta.exe</code>.(Citation: Qualys LolZarus)

Masquerade Task or Service

Lazarus Group has used a scheduled task named `SRCheck` to mask the execution of a malicious .dll.(Citation: ESET Twitter Ida Pro Nov 2021)

Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location

Lazarus Group has renamed malicious code to disguise it as Microsoft's narrator and other legitimate files.(Citation: CISA MAR-10288834-2.v1 TAINTEDSCRIBE MAY 2020)(Citation: Qualys LolZarus)

Dynamic-link Library Injection

A Lazarus Group malware sample performs reflective DLL injection.(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018)(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)

Indicator Removal

Lazarus Group has restored malicious KernelCallbackTable code to its original state after the process execution flow has been hijacked.(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)

Clear Command History

Lazarus Group has routinely deleted log files on a compromised router, including automatic log deletion through the use of the logrotate utility.(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021)

File Deletion

Lazarus Group malware has deleted files in various ways, including "suicide scripts" to delete malware binaries from the victim. Lazarus Group also uses secure file deletion to delete files from the victim.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: McAfee GhostSecret)

Timestomp

Several Lazarus Group malware families use timestomping, including modifying the last write timestamp of a specified Registry key to a random date, as well as copying the timestamp for legitimate .exe files (such as calc.exe or mspaint.exe) to its dropped files.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Loaders)(Citation: McAfee GhostSecret)

Valid Accounts

Lazarus Group has used administrator credentials to gain access to restricted network segments.(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021)

Create Process with Token

Lazarus Group keylogger KiloAlfa obtains user tokens from interactive sessions to execute itself with API call <code>CreateProcessAsUserA</code> under that user's context.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Tools)

Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

Lazarus Group has used shellcode within macros to decrypt and manually map DLLs and shellcode into memory at runtime.(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)(Citation: Qualys LolZarus)

Indirect Command Execution

Lazarus Group persistence mechanisms have used <code>forfiles.exe</code> to execute .htm files.(Citation: Qualys LolZarus)

System Binary Proxy Execution

Lazarus Group lnk files used for persistence have abused the Windows Update Client (<code>wuauclt.exe</code>) to execute a malicious DLL.(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)(Citation: Qualys LolZarus)

Mshta

Lazarus Group has used <code>mshta.exe</code> to execute HTML pages downloaded by initial access documents.(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)(Citation: Qualys LolZarus)

Rundll32

Lazarus Group has used rundll32 to execute malicious payloads on a compromised host.(Citation: ESET Twitter Ida Pro Nov 2021)

Bootkit

Lazarus Group malware WhiskeyAlfa-Three modifies sector 0 of the Master Boot Record (MBR) to ensure that the malware will persist even if a victim machine shuts down.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)

Hidden Files and Directories

Lazarus Group has used a VBA Macro to set its file attributes to System and Hidden and has named files with a dot prefix to hide them from the Finder application.(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018)(Citation: SentinelOne Lazarus macOS July 2020)(Citation: TrendMicro macOS Dacls May 2020)(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)

DLL

Lazarus Group has replaced `win_fw.dll`, an internal component that is executed during IDA Pro installation, with a malicious DLL to download and execute a payload.(Citation: ESET Twitter Ida Pro Nov 2021) Lazarus Group utilized DLL side-loading to execute malicious payloads through abuse of the legitimate processes `wsmprovhost.exe` and `dfrgui.exe`.(Citation: ASEC Lazarus 2022)

KernelCallbackTable

Lazarus Group has abused the <code>KernelCallbackTable</code> to hijack process control flow and execute shellcode.(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)(Citation: Qualys LolZarus)

Reflective Code Loading

Lazarus Group has changed memory protection permissions then overwritten in memory DLL function code with shellcode, which was later executed via KernelCallbackTable hijacking. Lazarus Group has also used shellcode within macros to decrypt and manually map DLLs into memory at runtime.(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)(Citation: Qualys LolZarus)