Kill Chain & Diamond Model Analysis

Map a threat actor or campaign across the Cyber Kill Chain and Diamond Model of Intrusion.

Saved analyses

UAC-0184 (threat actor)

Risk

Critical

18 techniques 40 tools/malware 10 vulnerabilities 12 IOCs 4/7 stages covered Deepest: Actions on Objectives

1 Reconnaissance

No data

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2 Weaponization

No data

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3 Delivery

No data

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4 Exploitation

T1053.005

Scheduled Task execution

T1059.001

PowerShell execution

T1059.002

AppleScript execution

T1059.003

Windows Command Shell execution

T1548

Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism privilege escalation

T1548.002

Bypass User Account Control privilege escalation

CVE CVE-2017-0199

CVE CVE-2017-11882

CVE CVE-2019-19781

CVE CVE-2020-10189

CVE CVE-2022-42475

CVE CVE-2024-3400

CVE CVE-2025-49704

CVE CVE-2025-49706

CVE CVE-2025-53770

CVE CVE-2025-53771

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5 Installation

T1087.002

Domain Account discovery

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6 Command & Control

T1113

Screen Capture collection

T1001.002

Steganography command and control

T1071

Application Layer Protocol command and control

T1071.001

Web Protocols command and control

T1071.002

File Transfer Protocols command and control

T1071.003

Mail Protocols command and control

T1071.004

DNS command and control

T1071.005

Publish/Subscribe Protocols command and control

T1550.002

Pass the Hash lateral movement

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7 Actions on Objectives

T1078

Valid Accounts stealth

T9000

Stage risk: Critical High Medium None

Tools & Malware (40)

Agent Tesla BADHATCH BlackEnergy Cobalt Cobalt Strike Curl Dark Global Havoc InvisiMole KONNI Kazuar Kimsuky Machete Malware MuddyWater NETWIRE Octopus OilRig POWRUNER Payload Payload PlugX PowerShell REvil ROKRAT Raccoon Raccoon Stealer RedLine RedLine Stealer Remcos Remcos RAT Remexi Sliver Sofacy Trojan Turla Ursnif Zebrocy phishing

Indicators of Compromise (12)

Domain

zscaler.com signspace.cloud

Filename

control.exe mshta.exe enterprise-attack-v18.1-analytics.xlsx scr.exe nircmd.exe gdi32.dll gdiplus.dll PLA.dll +1 more

URL

http://aveclagare.org/wp-content/plugins/wpstream/public/js/youtube.min.js.’

ATT&CK Tactic Coverage

Reconnaissance Resource Development Initial Access Execution Persistence Privilege Escalation Defense Evasion Credential Access Discovery Lateral Movement Collection Command & Control Exfiltration Impact

Recommended Mitigations

19 MITRE ATT&CK mitigations cover detected techniques

Browse all →

Exploitation (11)

M1018 User Account Management M1022 Restrict File and Directory Permissions M1026 Privileged Account Management M1028 Operating System Configuration M1038 Execution Prevention +6 more

Installation (1)

M1028 Operating System Configuration

Command & Control (6)

M1018 User Account Management M1026 Privileged Account Management M1031 Network Intrusion Prevention M1037 Filter Network Traffic M1051 Update Software +1 more

Actions on Objectives (8)

M1013 Application Developer Guidance M1015 Active Directory Configuration M1017 User Training M1018 User Account Management M1026 Privileged Account Management +3 more

Detection Coverage

17 strategies

4/7 stages covered

Exploitation (6)

DET0202 Behavioral Detection of Windows Command... DET0345 Detection Strategy for Abuse Elevation C... DET0388 Detection Strategy for T1548.002 – Bypas... DET0414 Detection of AppleScript-Based Execution... DET0441 Detection of Suspicious Scheduled Task C... +1 more

Installation (1)

DET0129 Domain Account Enumeration Across Platfo...

Command & Control (9)

DET0002 Behavioral Detection of Publish/Subscrib... DET0027 Detection of Web Protocol-Based C2 Over... DET0135 Detection of Mail Protocol-Based C2 Acti... DET0235 Detecting Steganographic Command and Con... DET0346 Detect Screen Capture via Commands and A... +4 more

Actions on Objectives (1)

DET0560 Detection of Valid Account Abuse Across...

Diamond Model of Intrusion

Adversary · Capability · Infrastructure · Victim

Completeness

4/4

Adversary

Confidence

60%

UAC-0184

Type: Unknown Active

Advanced Persistent Threat 39 Chafer Cadelspy Remexi ITG07 +9 more

Infrastructure 3 IOC(s)

50%

Domain

zscaler.com signspace.cloud

URL

http://aveclagare.org/wp-content/plugins/wpstream/public/js/youtube.min.js.’

Artifacts (9)

control.exe mshta.exe enterprise-attack-v18.1-analytics.xlsx scr.exe nircmd.exe gdi32.dll +3

Capability

50%

18 technique(s) 40 tool(s)/malware 10 CVE(s)

Agent Tesla BADHATCH BlackEnergy Cobalt Cobalt Strike Curl Dark Global +32

T9000

collection

T1113

command and control

T1001.002 T1071 T1071.001 T1071.002 +3

discovery

T1087.002

Victim

70%

Targeted Sectors

government defense financial-services energy telecommunications critical-infrastructure non-profit maritime media retail education utilities healthcare nuclear transportation manufacturing hospitality oil-gas aerospace

Targeted Countries

UA RU CN US TW AE IR NL KP IN JP SA PK AZ BY PL KR MX ES AU IL

Diamond Model Meta-Features

Phase

Actions on Objectives

Result

Active

Direction

Adversary → Infrastructure → Victim

Methodology

Unknown

Adversary → Capability

Adversary → Infrastructure

Capability → Victim

Infrastructure → Victim

Diamond Model edges

Activity Threads Kill chain phase → Diamond Model event mapping

4 Exploitation

Capability (Techniques)

T1053.005 T1059.001 T1059.002 T1059.003 T1548

Capability (Malware)

Agent Tesla BADHATCH BlackEnergy

Infrastructure

zscaler.com signspace.cloud http://aveclagare.org/wp-content/plugins/wpstream/public/js/youtube.min.js.’

5 Installation

Capability (Techniques)

T1087.002

Capability (Malware)

Agent Tesla BADHATCH BlackEnergy

Infrastructure

zscaler.com signspace.cloud http://aveclagare.org/wp-content/plugins/wpstream/public/js/youtube.min.js.’

6 Command & Control

Capability (Techniques)

T1113 T1001.002 T1071 T1071.001 T1071.002

Capability (Malware)

Agent Tesla BADHATCH BlackEnergy

Infrastructure

zscaler.com signspace.cloud http://aveclagare.org/wp-content/plugins/wpstream/public/js/youtube.min.js.’