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Detection Strategies DET0235 — Detecting Steganographic Command and Control via File + Network Correlation
DET0235

Detecting Steganographic Command and Control via File + Network Correlation

4 analytic(s) · 1 technique(s) detected

Analytics

4
AN0651 Analytic 0651
Windows

Detect the creation or modification of common media file formats (e.g., .jpg, .png, .wav) following suspicious process activity like compression or encryption, especially when paired with lateral movement or exfiltration behavior.

WinEventLog:Sysmon EventCode=1 WinEventLog:Sysmon EventCode=11 WinEventLog:Sysmon EventCode=3, 22 NSM:Flow Session Transfer Content
[FileExtensionFilter] Allows tuning of monitored file types (e.g., .jpg, .png, .docx).
[PayloadEntropyThreshold] Threshold for flagging potential hidden data in outbound payloads.
[ExecutionToExfilTimeWindow] Time window between media creation and network transmission.
AN0652 Analytic 0652
Linux

Unusual use of steganographic or media processing binaries (e.g., `steghide`, `ffmpeg`, `imagemagick`) followed by outbound communication to external IPs with high data output and media MIME types.

auditd:SYSCALL execve NSM:Flow Captured File Content NSM:Flow Observed File Transfers
[ToolNameMatch] Specify which binaries to monitor (e.g., steghide, outguess).
[OutboundTrafficPattern] Adjust based on known normal file upload services.
AN0653 Analytic 0653
macOS

Abnormal usage of Preview, ImageMagick, or binary editors to alter images/documents, followed by exfiltration or outbound connections with mismatched file MIME types or payload structure.

macos:unifiedlog File creation macos:osquery process_events NSM:Flow C2 exfiltration
[ParentProcessBaseline] Allow tuning based on expected apps calling image-editing tools.
[TimeDelta] Gap between file manipulation and outbound connection.
AN0654 Analytic 0654
ESXi

Suspicious modification of file artifacts (e.g., logs, ISO templates) on ESXi datastores, followed by beaconing or POST operations to external IPs potentially hiding payloads in file-like traffic.

esxi:vmkernel Storage access and file ops esxi:hostd Service initiated connections NSM:Flow Transferred file observations
[FilenamePattern] Tune for likely stego file names (e.g., wallpaper.jpg, template.iso).
[UnusualDestinationIP] Destination outside vCenter management subnet.

Detected Techniques

1

Command & Control (1)

Details

MITRE ID
DET0235
STIX ID
x-mitre-detection-strategy--0aa86929-f232-4fa7-bdc9-120f917a3509
Analytics
4
Techniques Detected
1
By Tactic
Command & Control
1
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