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On Xtensa targets with CONFIG_USERSPACE and CONFIG_XTENSA_MMU, the page-table code (arch/xtensa/core/ptables.c) maintains a global list, xtensa_domain_list, of active memory domains using a list node embedded inside the caller-owned struct k_mem_domain. When a domain is destroyed via k_mem_domain_deinit() -> arch_mem_domain_deinit(), the page tables are torn down and domain->arch.ptables is set to NULL, but the domain's node was not removed from xtensa_domain_list. The freed/deinitialized domain therefore remained linked into the global list as a dangling pointer into caller-owned storage that may then be freed or reused. Any subsequent arch_mem_map()/arch_mem_unmap() operation (widely invoked by kernel memory-mapping and demand-paging code) traverses the stale node and dereferences domain->ptables: at minimum a NULL pointer dereference causing a fatal MMU exception (denial of service), and if the k_mem_domain storage has been freed or reused, a use-after-free in which a stale/controlled ptables value is dereferenced and written through during the page-table walk (l2_page_table_map writes l1_table[...] and l2_table[...], and xtensa_mmu_compute_domain_regs writes into the domain struct and the L1 table), yielding page-table memory corruption that can undermine userspace isolation. The vulnerable path is reachable only from privileged kernel/supervisor code (k_mem_domain_deinit is not a syscall), not directly from unprivileged user threads or remotely. Affected: Zephyr v4.4.0 (the Xtensa memory-domain de-initialization feature was introduced in commit 3032b58f52d and first shipped in v4.4.0); fixed on main by adding sys_slist_find_and_remove() in arch_mem_domain_deinit(). The Xtensa MPU path is unaffected.
6th percentile