Also known as: Colddraw
The Cuba Ransomware, also known as Colddraw Ransomware, was first identified in the threat landscape in 2019 and built a relatively small but selected list of victims. The group is also known as Fidel Ransomware, due to a characteristic marker placed at the beginning of all encrypted files. This file marker is used as an indicator for the ransomware and its decoder that the file has been encrypted.<br> <br> Despite its name and the Cuban nationalist style on its leak site, it is difficult to assert any connection or affiliation with the Republic of Cuba. The group has been linked to a Russian-language threat actor by Profero researchers due to some details of incorrect translation they discovered, as well as the discovery of a 404 page containing text in Russian on the threat actor's own leak site.<br> <br> According to BlackBerry, based on the analysis of the code strings used in the campaign analyzed in 2023, there were indications that the developer behind the Cuba ransomware speaks Russian.<br> <br> The ransomware operators use a double extortion approach, and following the USA, in August 2022, it was believed that the Cuba ransomware group had compromised 101 entities, demanding $145 million in ransom payments and receiving up to $60 million.<br> <br> The group used a similar set of TTPs, with only a slight change each year, as they generally consist of LOLBins (executables that are part of the operating system and can be exploited to support an attack), exploits, off-the-shelf and custom malware, as well as intrusion tools like Cobalt Strike and Metasploit.<br> <br> In 2022, the group allegedly developed a relationship with operators of the Industrial Spy market, using their platform as a means of data leakage.<BR>Source: https://github.com/crocodyli/ThreatActors-TTPs Known victims: 103 1 ransom note(s) on file
Objectives
Executive Summary
The Cuba Ransomware group, also known as Colddraw, is a sophisticated cybercriminal organization specializing in ransomware attacks. They use double extortion tactics to maximize payouts and have targeted numerous victims across various industries, resulting in significant financial losses.
Goals & Targeting
Cuba Ransomware's primary goals are financial gain through ransoms and secondary gains from data exfiltration for sale or public release. The group likely targets sectors with significant financial value or sensitive information, such as healthcare, education, energy, and manufacturing. Their broad targeting strategy reflects a focus on maximizing revenue rather than sector-specific interests.
Enhanced Description
Cuba Ransomware emerged in 2019 and operates under the alias Colddraw. Despite its Cuban-inspired name, there is no confirmed link to Cuba; instead, evidence suggests a Russian-speaking developer. Known for embedding the string 'Fidel' at the beginning of encrypted files as a marker, they employ a double extortion approach: encrypting data and threatening data leaks if ransom isn't paid. Notable TTPs include the use of Cobalt Strike and Metasploit alongside custom tools. They target high-value assets across industries, with over 103 known victims to date.
Key Capabilities
MITRE ATT&CK Tactics
ATT&CK Techniques
Software / Tooling
Campaigns & Victims
The group has demonstrated a steady operational tempo since 2019, with campaigns peaking in mid-2022 where 101 entities were targeted. Their victims include businesses and organizations from various industries globally, leveraging double extortion to coerce higher ransom payments ($60M-$145M). Notable for adapting their techniques minimally yet effectively each year.
IOC Patterns
Recommended Actions
Suggested Tags
Confidence Assessment
High confidence in identifying Cuba Ransomware as a distinct threat group, with clear TTPs and financial incentives. Remaining uncertainties include precise targeting patterns across industries due to limited data.
No techniques linked yet.
No tools linked yet.
No campaigns linked yet.
No observed data linked yet.
No references recorded yet.
0
Techniques
0
Tools
0
Campaigns
2
IOCs
0
Observed Data
0
Tactics