Also known as: Fancy Bear, APT28, port 1433, Mare, Storm-2697, Bloody Wolf, SkyCloak, Awaken Likho, Bearlyfy, laboo.boo, Librarian Ghouls, Librarian Likho, Rezet, Lone Wolf, Moonshine Trickster, Clubfoot Wolf, Void Arachne, Watch Wolf, Ratopak Spider, UAC-0008, UAC-0001, Forest Blizzard, Outrider Tiger, Fishing Elephant, Earth Vetala, MERCURY, Mango Sandstorm, Static Kitten, TA450, Archer RAT, RUSTRIC, detects installed security software, establishes contact with a, MuddyWater, CHAR, Olalampo, Storm-0842, Red Sandstorm, Banished Kitten, HOPPINGANT by researchers
Head Mare is a hacktivism focussed threat actor group known for targeting Russia and Belarus sectors using a remote access malware called PhantomRAT. They have been observed executing malicious code through specially crafted RAR archives, different from previous attacks exploiting vulnerabilities. The attribution of their campaign to Ukraine is uncertain due to limited visibility inside Russian networks. PhantomCore's use of RAR archives in their attack chain has been previously observed in other threat actor groups like Forest Blizzard.
Targeted Sectors
Targeted Countries / Regions
Executive Summary
Head Mare is a suspected hacktivist threat actor group primarily targeting sectors and countries in Russia and Belarus using the PhantomRAT malware delivered via malicious RAR archives. Their activities may be linked to cyber-espionage or politically motivated attacks, though their具体 motivations and capabilities remain uncertain due to limited intelligence visibility.
Goals & Targeting
Head Mare's targeting profile suggests a focus on sectors and countries that may be perceived as adversaries or politically sensitive due to their geographic and sector-specific attacks. The group appears motivated by potential hacktivist goals, possibly linked to geopolitical tensions in Eastern Europe. Their victims are likely selected based on political or ideological grounds, targeting entities in Russia and Belarus, which could indicate a pro-Ukrainian or anti-Kremlin sentiment. The choice of malware delivery method (malicious RAR archives) implies a technical capability beyond basic hacktivism, suggesting a possible evolution toward more sophisticated cyber-espionage activities.
Enhanced Description
Head Mare is a threat actor group suspected to specialize in hacktivism, with a primary focus on targeting entities within Russia and Belarus. They are known for using a remote access malware called PhantomRAT, which they have delivered through malicious RAR archives. This method of attack differs from previous incidents involving similar malware, as it employs unique delivery mechanisms. The group's activities raise concerns about potential cyber-espionage or disruptive operations targeting critical sectors in Eastern Europe. Despite their apparent focus on Russian and Belarusian targets, the attribution of Head Mare to Ukraine remains uncertain due to the lack of visibility within Russian networks. Their use of RAR archives for malicious payloads has been observed in other threat actor groups, such as Forest Blizzard, suggesting a possible convergence in attack methods among some cyber actors.
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MITRE ATT&CK Tactics
ATT&CK Techniques
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Campaigns & Victims
Head Mare's campaigns appear to be focused on long-term persistence and情报 collection rather than immediate payload execution. Their reliance on RAR archives suggests a methodical approach, possibly targeting specific individuals or entities within the financial or government sectors. Notable past operations include multiple waves of attacks against Russian and Belarusian targets, though exact details remain scarce due to limited intelligence sharing from affected regions.
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Confidence Assessment
The analysis of Head Mare is based on limited and fragmented intelligence data. The group's sophistication level, primary motivations, and exact capabilities remain uncertain. While their use of PhantomRAT and RAR-based attacks provides some context, the lack of visibility into Russian and Belarusian networks hampers a definitive assessment of their operational scope and objectives. Further intelligence sharing and technical analysis are required to validate their specific tactics and campaign patterns.
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