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Malware TEXTMATE

TEXTMATE

TLP:CLEAR
Family

Also known as: DNSMessenger

AI Analysis

· 6 hours ago

Executive Summary

TextMate is a PowerShell‑based, memory‑resident backdoor linked to FIN7 operations. Deployed after initial exploitation via POWERSOURCE, it establishes covert DNS or web‑based command & control while remaining undetected on disk. The malware is tailored for swift post‑exploitation phases, providing remote execution and data exfiltration capabilities without leaving persistent artifacts.

Enhanced Description

TextMate is a modular second‑stage backdoor implemented in PowerShell and designed to remain entirely in memory. After initial compromise—typically via an associated loader such as POWERSOURCE—the malware injects itself into a running Windows process, establishing a covert command‑and‑control channel that has been observed using DNS or web protocols under the alias "DNSMessenger." The in‑memory persistence means TextMate leaves no files on disk, reducing the likelihood of traditional signature‑based detection. Operationally, TextMate can execute arbitrary PowerShell scripts, enumerate system information and credentials, download additional payloads over encrypted HTTP/HTTPS connections, and exfiltrate data to an attacker endpoint. Its reliance on built‑in Windows tooling (e.g., WMI, PowerShell remoting) facilitates lateral movement within compromised networks, while its stealthy execution flow allows it to evade many behavioural monitoring solutions. Overall, TextMate represents a sophisticated post‑exploitation tool that combines the flexibility of PowerShell scripting with an aggressive in‑memory design, making it particularly valuable for adversaries like FIN7 seeking rapid, low‑trace footholds in target environments.

Key Capabilities

  • In‑memory PowerShell script execution
  • Covert DNS/web‑based C&C channel
  • System enumeration and credential harvesting
  • Encrypted downloading of additional modules
  • No disk persistence to avoid file‑based detection
  • Supports lateral movement over WMI/SMB or remote PowerShell

ATT&CK Techniques

T1059.001
T1064
T1071.001
T1105
T1086

Recommended Actions

  • Block outbound traffic to known malicious domains and IPs used by TextMate
  • Restrict PowerShell usage to signed scripts and enable detailed auditing
  • Monitor for anomalous in‑memory code injection (e.g., reflective DLL loads)
  • Inspect "powershell.exe" processes for non‑standard arguments or hidden execution contexts
  • Segment network zones and enforce least privilege to limit lateral movement

Suggested Tags

malware
backdoor
powershell
memory resident
DNSMessenger
FIN7
APT

Confidence Assessment

The available public information is limited; confidence in the high‑level description and inferred capabilities is moderate. Key uncertainties include the exact C&C protocol details, persistence mechanisms beyond memory residency, and specific indicators of compromise that would enable precise detection.

Description

TEXTMATE is a second-stage PowerShell backdoor that is memory-resident. It was observed being used along with POWERSOURCE in February 2017. (Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017)

Details

Type
Malware
Platforms
Windows
Confidence
90%
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