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Kill Chain & Diamond Model Analysis

Map a threat actor or campaign across the Cyber Kill Chain and Diamond Model of Intrusion.

Saved analyses
CoralRaider (threat actor)
Risk
85
Critical
40 techniques 40 tools/malware 0 vulnerabilities 40 IOCs 7/7 stages covered Deepest: Actions on Objectives
1 Reconnaissance
1
T1595
Active Scanning reconnaissance
›
2 Weaponization
4
T1583
Acquire Infrastructure resource development
T1584
Compromise Infrastructure resource development
T1586
Compromise Accounts resource development
T1650
Acquire Access resource development
›
3 Delivery
1
T1659
Content Injection initial access
›
4 Exploitation
5
T1059
Command and Scripting Interpreter execution
T1059.001
PowerShell execution
T1609
Container Administration Command execution
T1651
Cloud Administration Command execution
T1548
Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism privilege escalation
›
5 Installation
17
T1110
Brute Force credential access
T1557
Adversary-in-the-Middle credential access
T1010
Application Window Discovery discovery
T1087
Account Discovery discovery
T1217
Browser Information Discovery discovery
T1526
Cloud Service Discovery discovery
T1538
Cloud Service Dashboard discovery
T1580
Cloud Infrastructure Discovery discovery
T1613
Container and Resource Discovery discovery
T1619
Cloud Storage Object Discovery discovery
T1037
Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts persistence
T1098
Account Manipulation persistence
T1136
Create Account persistence
T1543
Create or Modify System Process persistence
T1547
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution persistence
T1554
Compromise Host Software Binary persistence
T1671
Cloud Application Integration persistence
›
6 Command & Control
7
T1115
Clipboard Data collection
T1119
Automated Collection collection
T1123
Audio Capture collection
T1185
Browser Session Hijacking collection
T1560
Archive Collected Data collection
T1071
Application Layer Protocol command and control
T1092
Communication Through Removable Media command and control
›
7 Actions on Objectives
5
T1020
Automated Exfiltration exfiltration
T1531
Account Access Removal impact
T1134
Access Token Manipulation stealth
T1197
BITS Jobs stealth
T1612
Build Image on Host stealth
Stage risk: Critical High Medium None

Tools & Malware (40)

Akira BITS BlackByte Carbanak Chollima Cobalt CryptBot Dark Expand GitHub Global Group Policy Indrik Spider Infostealer Jackal Kimsuky Leverage LummaC2 Machete Magic Hound Malware MuddyWater Naikon Patchwork Payload Payload PowerShell ROTbot Remote Access Tools Rhadamanthys Systemd Telegram Trojan Unknown Void Volt Typhoon Winnti XClient Stealer inter phishing

Indicators of Compromise (40)

Domain
denv-2.b-cdn.net download-main5.b-cdn.net dashdisk-2.b-cdn.net metrodown-3.b-cdn.net zexodown-2.b-cdn.net metrodown-2.b-cdn.net Snort.org techsheck.b-cdn.net
Email Address
rocke@live.cn
Filename
FoDHelper.exe spoolsv.exe r.bat X1xDd.exe dialer.exe openwith.exe Forfiles.exe mshta.exe +17 more
IPv4 Address
108.0.0.0 113.0.0.0 24.0.0.0 118.71.64.18 149.248.79.205 139.99.23.9

ATT&CK Tactic Coverage

Reconnaissance Resource Development Initial Access Execution Persistence Privilege Escalation Defense Evasion Credential Access Discovery Lateral Movement Collection Command & Control Exfiltration Impact

Recommended Mitigations

27 MITRE ATT&CK mitigations cover detected techniques

Browse all →
Reconnaissance (1)
M1056 Pre-compromise
Weaponization (1)
M1056 Pre-compromise
Delivery (2)
M1021 Restrict Web-Based Content M1041 Encrypt Sensitive Information
Exploitation (15)
M1018 User Account Management M1021 Restrict Web-Based Content M1022 Restrict File and Directory Permissions M1026 Privileged Account Management M1028 Operating System Configuration +10 more
Installation (20)
M1017 User Training M1018 User Account Management M1022 Restrict File and Directory Permissions M1024 Restrict Registry Permissions M1026 Privileged Account Management +15 more
Command & Control (9)
M1017 User Training M1018 User Account Management M1028 Operating System Configuration M1029 Remote Data Storage M1031 Network Intrusion Prevention +4 more
Actions on Objectives (7)
M1018 User Account Management M1026 Privileged Account Management M1028 Operating System Configuration M1030 Network Segmentation M1035 Limit Access to Resource Over Network +2 more

Detection Coverage

40 strategies
7/7 stages covered

Reconnaissance (1)

DET0830 Detection of Active Scanning

Weaponization (4)

DET0876 Detection of Compromise Accounts DET0884 Detection of Acquire Access DET0885 Detection of Compromise Infrastructure DET0895 Detection of Acquire Infrastructure

Delivery (1)

DET0349 Detection Strategy for Content Injection

Exploitation (5)

DET0065 Detection Strategy for Container Adminis... DET0345 Detection Strategy for Abuse Elevation C... DET0455 Abuse of PowerShell for Arbitrary Execut... DET0516 Behavioral Detection of Command and Scri... DET0545 Detection Strategy for Cloud Administrat...

Installation (17)

DET0013 Detection of Local Browser Artifact Acce... DET0096 Account Manipulation Behavior Chain Dete... DET0097 Detection of Application Window Enumerat... DET0112 Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts Det... DET0169 Detection Strategy for Cloud Infrastruct... +12 more

Command & Control (7)

DET0090 Cross-host C2 via Removable Media Relay DET0186 Automated File and API Collection Detect... DET0221 Behavioral Detection Strategy for T1123... DET0341 Clipboard Data Access with Anomalous Con... DET0444 Detection of Command and Control Over Ap... +2 more

Actions on Objectives (5)

DET0098 Detect abuse of Windows BITS Jobs for do... DET0120 Account Access Removal via Multi-Platfor... DET0283 Behavior-chain detection for T1134 Acces... DET0397 Automated Exfiltration Detection Strateg... DET0459 Detection Strategy for Build Image on Ho...

Diamond Model of Intrusion

Adversary · Capability · Infrastructure · Victim

Completeness
4/4
Adversary
Confidence
60%

CoralRaider

Type: Unknown Active
LummaC2 Stealer Sandworm Team Operation Cleaver Shell Crew WebMasters +17 more
Infrastructure 14 IOC(s)
50%
Domain
denv-2.b-cdn.net download-main5.b-cdn.net dashdisk-2.b-cdn.net metrodown-3.b-cdn.net zexodown-2.b-cdn.net +3
IPv4 Address
108.0.0.0 113.0.0.0 24.0.0.0 118.71.64.18 149.248.79.205 +1
Artifacts (26)
rocke@live.cn FoDHelper.exe spoolsv.exe r.bat X1xDd.exe dialer.exe +20
Capability
50%
40 technique(s) 40 tool(s)/malware
Akira BITS BlackByte Carbanak Chollima Cobalt CryptBot Dark +32
collection
T1115 T1119 T1123 T1185 +1
command and control
T1071 T1092
credential access
T1110 T1557
discovery
T1010 T1087 T1217 T1526 +4
Victim
70%

Targeted Sectors

government financial-services defense telecommunications media education healthcare manufacturing non-profit energy critical-infrastructure pharmaceutical aviation hospitality aerospace information-technology retail think-tank transportation mining chemical gaming legal-services nuclear entertainment oil-gas maritime construction utilities

Targeted Countries

US CN RU VN IR PK JP IL GB AU SA TW AE UA DE KR IN TR PL SG BY NG MX ES CA SY EG RO FR KP IT LB AZ KZ

Diamond Model Meta-Features

Phase

Actions on Objectives

Result

Active

Direction

Adversary → Infrastructure → Victim

Methodology

Unknown

Adversary → Capability
Adversary → Infrastructure
Capability → Victim
Infrastructure → Victim
Diamond Model edges

Activity Threads Kill chain phase → Diamond Model event mapping

1 Reconnaissance

Capability (Techniques)

T1595

Capability (Malware)

Akira BITS BlackByte
2 Weaponization

Capability (Techniques)

T1583 T1584 T1586 T1650

Capability (Malware)

Akira BITS BlackByte
3 Delivery

Capability (Techniques)

T1659

Capability (Malware)

Akira BITS BlackByte
4 Exploitation

Capability (Malware)

Akira BITS BlackByte
5 Installation

Capability (Malware)

Akira BITS BlackByte
6 Command & Control

Capability (Malware)

Akira BITS BlackByte
7 Actions on Objectives

Capability (Techniques)

T1020 T1531

Capability (Malware)

Akira BITS BlackByte
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