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Detection Strategies DET0236 — Detection Strategy for Spearphishing Attachment across OS Platforms
DET0236

Detection Strategy for Spearphishing Attachment across OS Platforms

3 analytic(s) · 1 technique(s) detected

Analytics

3
AN0655 Analytic 0655
Windows

Detection of spearphishing attachments by correlating suspicious email delivery with subsequent file creation and abnormal process execution (e.g., Office spawning PowerShell or CMD). Behavior chain includes inbound email metadata → attachment stored on disk → process execution → outbound network activity.

m365:unified Send/Receive: Inbound emails with attachments from suspicious or spoofed senders WinEventLog:Sysmon EventCode=11 WinEventLog:Sysmon EventCode=1 WinEventLog:Sysmon EventCode=3, 22
[AttachmentExtensions] List of high-risk extensions to monitor (e.g., .exe, .js, .vbs, .docm, .xlsm).
[SuspiciousParentChildPairs] Process lineage patterns considered malicious (e.g., winword.exe → powershell.exe).
[TimeWindow] Correlation window between email receipt, file creation, and process execution.
AN0656 Analytic 0656
Linux

Phishing attachments executed on Linux systems are detected by linking email logs to file creation in mail directories and subsequent suspicious process execution. Look for unexpected binaries or scripts spawned from user mail directories and anomalous outbound network activity.

Application:Mail Inbound email attachments logged from MTAs with suspicious metadata auditd:SYSCALL execve: Execution of files saved in mail or download directories NSM:Flow Outbound traffic from suspicious new processes post-attachment execution
[AttachmentStoragePaths] Monitored directories for email attachments (e.g., /var/mail, ~/Maildir, ~/Downloads).
[ScriptInterpreters] List of interpreters to monitor when spawned by mail clients (e.g., bash, python, perl).
AN0657 Analytic 0657
macOS

Phishing attachment detection on macOS through correlation of Mail app logs, file creation in user directories, and abnormal process execution (e.g., Preview.app or Mail.app spawning Terminal or scripting binaries). Network traffic after attachment interaction is also monitored.

macos:unifiedlog Inbound messages with attachments from suspicious domains macos:unifiedlog Execution of Terminal, osascript, or other interpreters originating from Mail or Preview macos:unifiedlog Attachment files written to ~/Downloads or temporary folders
[ExecutionDelayThreshold] Time delay between attachment download and execution considered suspicious.
[SuspiciousParentApps] Parent processes expected to rarely spawn child processes (e.g., Mail.app, Preview.app).

Detected Techniques

1

Details

MITRE ID
DET0236
STIX ID
x-mitre-detection-strategy--8d904004-e492-4f76-9f84-be75fc61e5c5
Analytics
3
Techniques Detected
1
By Tactic
Initial Access
1
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