AN0006
Analytic 0006
Windows
Adversary uses built-in tools such as 'net user /add /domain' or PowerShell to create a domain user account. The behavior chain includes: (1) suspicious process execution on a domain controller followed by (2) user account creation event (Event ID 4720) on the same host.
WinEventLog:Security
EventCode=4720
WinEventLog:Sysmon
EventCode=1
[TimeWindow]
Detection triggers when Event ID 4720 follows a suspicious process within 2 minutes.
[ParentProcessName]
Allow filtering of known admin tools vs adversarial misuse (e.g., net.exe, powershell.exe).
[UserContext]
Filter accounts with domain admin privileges creating new users vs standard helpdesk roles.
[HostRole]
Restrict to only domain controller hosts to reduce noise from workstations.
AN0007
Analytic 0007
Linux
Adversary with access to domain management tools (e.g., `realmd`, `samba-tool`, `ldapmodify`) creates a new domain user via command-line utilities. Behavior chain: LDAP command or script triggers → user entry added in AD via Kerberos/LDAP traffic.
auditd:SYSCALL
execution of realmd, samba-tool, or ldapmodify with user-related arguments
NSM:Flow
TGS-REQ and AS-REQ seen for new user shortly after domain-modifying process
[DomainToolUsed]
realmd, samba-tool, ldapmodify or custom script
[TrafficWindow]
Expected Kerberos traffic from new domain account within X minutes of command
[SessionType]
Script execution from interactive shell vs scheduled task
AN0008
Analytic 0008
macOS
macOS clients joined to AD via LDAP may script account provisioning via `dsconfigad`, `dscl`, or LDAP scripts. Detection occurs when such tools run on a domain-joined system, followed by authentication attempts by a previously unseen account.
macos:unifiedlog
dsconfigad or dscl with create or append options for AD-bound users
macos:unifiedlog
UserLoggedIn
[EnrollmentStatus]
Only flag on AD-bound systems with valid LDAP context
[AccountType]
Distinguish between user accounts and computer accounts