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Detection Strategies DET0009 — Supply-chain tamper in dependencies/dev-tools (manager→write/install→first-run→egress)
DET0009

Supply-chain tamper in dependencies/dev-tools (manager→write/install→first-run→egress)

3 analytic(s) · 1 technique(s) detected

Analytics

3
AN0021 Analytic 0021
Windows

Adversary manipulates dependencies/dev tools used by developers or CI: a package manager (npm/yarn/pnpm, pip/pipenv, nuget/dotnet, chocolatey/winget, maven/gradle) or a compiler/IDE downloads or restores content; files are written under project paths and execution paths (node_modules, packages, .nuget, .gradle, .m2, %AppData%\npm, %UserProfile%\.cargo\bin, temp build dirs). First run of newly written components triggers scripts (preinstall/postinstall), shell/PowerShell spawning, or loader DLLs, followed by network egress to non-approved registries/CDNs.

WinEventLog:Sysmon EventCode=1 WinEventLog:Sysmon EventCode=7 WinEventLog:Sysmon EventCode=11 WinEventLog:Sysmon EventCode=13, 14 WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-CodeIntegrity/Operational Invalid/Unsigned image when developer tool launches newly installed binaries NSM:Flow First-time outbound connections to package registries or unknown hosts immediately after restore/build
[TimeWindow] Correlate file write by package manager to first execution and egress (default 90 minutes).
[ApprovedRegistries] Allow-listed registries (e.g., registry.npmjs.org, pypi.org, nuget.org, maven.apache.org, company proxies/CDNs).
[DevHosts] Limit analytics to engineering endpoints/CI agents to reduce noise.
[TrustedPublishers] Code-signing publishers acceptable for dev tools.
AN0022 Analytic 0022
Linux

Developer or CI invokes package managers/compilers (apt/yum + build-essential, npm/yarn/pnpm, pip/pip3, gem, cargo, go, maven/gradle). These write executable or script files into PATH or project dirs and immediately execute embedded lifecycle hooks (preinstall/postinstall, setup.py, npm scripts) that spawn shells or curl/wget, followed by egress to unfamiliar registries or domains.

auditd:SYSCALL execve auditd:SYSCALL rename, chmod journald:package dpkg/apt or yum/dnf transaction logs (install/update of build tools) NSM:Flow First-time egress to new registries/CDNs post-install/build
[ApprovedRepos] Allowed APT/YUM repos and GPG keys for build tools.
[PathScope] Monitor /usr/local/bin, /usr/bin, /opt/*/bin, ~/.local/bin, node_modules/.bin, .venv/bin, .cargo/bin, .gradle, .m2.
[TimeWindow] Default 90 minutes for write→exec→egress linkage.
AN0023 Analytic 0023
macOS

Developer tools (Homebrew, pip, npm/yarn, Xcode builds) install or update dependencies; new Mach-O or scripts appear under /usr/local, /opt/homebrew, ~/Library/Application Support, project dirs (node_modules/.bin, venv/bin). First run spawns sh/zsh/osascript/curl and new outbound flows; Gatekeeper/AMFI may flag unsigned components.

macos:unifiedlog softwareupdated/homebrew/install logs, pkginstalld events macos:endpointsecurity exec NSM:Flow First-time egress to non-approved registries after dependency install
[AllowedTeamIDs] Apple Developer Team IDs for approved dev tools (Xcode, JetBrains, etc.).
[BrewTapsAllowList] Homebrew taps allowed in your environment.
[TimeWindow] Default 90 minutes.

Details

MITRE ID
DET0009
STIX ID
x-mitre-detection-strategy--ec870f2d-bba3-43f9-95b8-c2f85678dba4
Analytics
3
Techniques Detected
1
By Tactic
Initial Access
1
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