Threaticon
Toggle sidebar

You're viewing a limited, public preview. Log in for full access.

Log in User Guide
Log in Get started
Attack Patterns T1036.001 — Invalid Code Signature
T1036.001

Invalid Code Signature

Stealth
TLP:CLEAR

Description

Adversaries may attempt to mimic features of valid code signatures to increase the chance of deceiving a user, analyst, or tool. Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a binary from the developer and a guarantee that the binary has not been tampered with. Adversaries can copy the metadata and signature information from a signed program, then use it as a template for an unsigned program. Files with invalid code signatures will fail digital signature validation checks, but they may appear more legitimate to users and security tools may improperly handle these files.(Citation: Threatexpress MetaTwin 2017) Unlike Code Signing, this activity will not result in a valid signature.

MITRE ATT&CK Detection Strategies
1

DET0031 Invalid Code Signature Execution Detection via Metadata and Behavioral Context
AN0090 macOS

Binaries or applications executed with tampered or unverifiable code signatures. Often tied to Gatekeeper bypasses, App Translocation, or use of unsigned launch daemons by untrusted users.

macos:unifiedlog macos:endpointsecurity fs:fileevents
AN0089 Windows

Execution of binaries with invalid digital signatures, where metadata claims code is signed but validation fails. Behavior is often correlated with suspicious parent processes or unexpected execution paths.

WinEventLog:Sysmon WinEventLog:Windows Defender WinEventLog:PowerShell

MITRE ATT&CK Mitigations
1

M1045

Code Signing

Code Signing is a security process that ensures the authenticity and integrity of software by digitally signing executables, scripts, and other code artifacts. It prevents untrusted or malicious code from executing by verifying the digital signatures against trusted sources. Code signing protects against tampering, impersonation, and distribution of unauthorized or malicious software, forming a critical defense against supply chain and software exploitation attacks. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Enforce Signed Code Execution: - Implementation: Configure operating systems (e.g., Windows with AppLocker or Linux with Secure Boot) to allow only signed code to execute. - Use Case: Prevent the execution of malicious PowerShell scripts by requiring all scripts to be signed with a trusted certificate. Vendor-Signed Driver Enforcement: - Implementation: Enable kernel-mode code signing to ensure that only drivers signed by trusted vendors can be loaded. - Use Case: A malicious driver attempting to modify system memory fails to load because it lacks a valid signature. Certificate Revocation Management: - Implementation: Use Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) or Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) to block certificates associated with compromised or deprecated code. - Use Case: A compromised certificate used to sign a malicious update is revoked, preventing further execution of the software. Third-Party Software Verification: - Implementation: Require software from external vendors to be signed with valid certificates before deployment. - Use Case: An organization only deploys signed and verified third-party software to prevent supply chain attacks. Script Integrity in CI/CD Pipelines: - Implementation: Integrate code signing into CI/CD pipelines to sign and verify code artifacts before production release. - Use Case: A software company ensures that all production builds are signed, preventing tampered builds from reaching customers. **Key Components of Code Signing** - Digital Signature Verification: Verifies the authenticity of code by ensuring it was signed by a trusted entity. - Certificate Management: Uses Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) to manage signing certificates and revocation lists. - Enforced Policy for Unsigned Code: Prevents the execution of unsigned or untrusted binaries and scripts. - Hash Integrity Check: Confirms that code has not been altered since signing by comparing cryptographic hashes.

Details

Platforms
Macos
Windows
Added
May 2, 2026
Leaving Threaticon

This link opens an external site that isn't part of the platform.